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and Tf NSW because the probability of using a private car for transport is high. The preference for use of
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Introduction
From the context of transport management in Sydney, it is assumed that Transport for 
New South Wales (TfNSW) behaves in such way as to satisfy NSW travellers and provide 
a better transport service. The role of TfNSW, as an agent, is to maximise the utility of 
the travellers’ (the principal) satisfactions within available resources by providing suitable 
modes of transport services. In order to understand the utility function of travellers towards 
mode choice, the TfNSW should have information about the nature of travellers’ desires 
and expectations based on choice attributes both observed and latent. Thus, an inferred 
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relationship is understood to exist between the ‘traveller’ and ‘TfNSW’. Such a two party 
relationship is indicated in agency theory (AT).
AT, also known as the Principal-Agent or Principal AT/Model, describes the relation-
ship between two or more parties in which one party is designated as the principal that 
Table 1. summary of extant research.
Issues/subjects Methods used Findings Sources
government support 
programs (gsPs) and 
academic entrepre-
neurship 
agency theory The gsPs have an effect on reducing the agency 
problems in the relationship
rasmussen and  
gulbrandsen (2012)
labour market agency theory and 
dichotomisation 
process
in the private sector, the principal is largely con-
trolling the agents’ activities via contemporary 
hrM systems and by tying wages to perfor-
mance. on the contrary, the principal’s lack of 
control over the agent’s activities is noticed in 
the public sector
cohen and baruch 
(2010)
capital planning and 
financing 
interview and 
principal-agent 
model
hospital planning process should necessarily be 
informed by an explicit understanding of pow-
erful groups (e.g. central government) involved 
and their divergent preferences and utilities to 
avoid agency problems
Thompson and 
McKee (2011)
supply chain manage-
ment 
agency theo-
ry and out-
come-based and 
behaviour-based 
approaches 
agent-based factors such as information asym-
metry, goal conflict, risk aversion of suppliers, 
length of relationship, and task characteristics, 
can be expected to influence how firms design 
and manage their quality management systems 
for supply chains
Zu and Kaynak (2012)
risk management Framework of 
agency theory
empirical results indicate that purchasing 
organisations address various sources of supply 
risk by implementing management techniques 
that reduce the likelihood that detrimental 
events will occur. Firm size, purchases as a 
percentage of sales, and industry characteristics 
have also been found to influence the manner 
in which supplier behaviours are managed
Zsidisin and ellram 
(2003)
Public transportation structural equation 
model 
Public transportation offers low utility due to 
low degree of congruence between user pref-
erences and service provided. increased utility 
may increase new customers and thus agency 
relationship may improve
andreassen (1995)
Managerial ownership logistics regres-
sion approach 
The risk at lower level of managerial is signif-
icant and positive relations with managerial 
ownership concentration. This supports the 
hypothesis that a higher level of managerial 
ownership can reduce the agency conflict 
between external equity claimholders and 
managers
ahmed (2009)
organisational manage-
ment 
Mixed logit model agency theory and stewardship theory are not 
necessarily in conflict with each other but can 
be combined into a more general governance 
framework for non-profit organisations. conse-
quently, incentive structures that incorporate 
different types of objectives can facilitate the 
recruitment and retention of employees in 
non-profit organisations
Puyvelde, caers, bois, 
and Jegers (2013)
doctor and patients’ 
preferences 
logit model gPs are not fully aware of patient preferences 
at an aggregate level. even though gPs almost 
succeeded in predicting the rank order of 
preferences in the unforced choice, there is still 
room for improving the agency relationship in 
the organisation of general practice
Pedersen, Kaer, Krag-
strup, and hansen 
(2012), scott and Vick 
(1999)
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assigns another party, called the agent, to perform tasks on behalf of the principal (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; Ross, 1973). AT assumes that the agent has more informa-
tion than the principal (Grammenos & Papapostolou, 2012), a condition that is known as 
informational asymmetry, and this adversely affects the principal’s ability to monitor the 
agent’s activities. Another assumption of AT is that both principal and agent act rationally 
and try to maximise their own interests, which ultimately results in a conflict of interest/
choice that is referred to as moral hazard (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); that is the dilemma of 
acting against the interest of the principal as the agent tries to maximise its own interests. 
Since the principal does not have access to decisions that are made by an agent, it is unable 
to monitor whether the agent’s action(s) are in their best interests. This is called adverse 
selection or choice conflict.
Because of the useful assumptions of AT discussed above, the theory is being applied 
to different fields (Kivisto, 2005). Table 1 summarises the contemporary research on AT 
in different sectors.
The research described in Table 1 shows that AT is being used in various fields including 
transportation. Examination of the relationship between traveller and transport service 
providers is rare in extant research. When travellers entrust their choice for safe, reliable, 
comfortable and cheap transport to the TfNSW, this creates a metaphorical contract, known 
as an agency contract (Anwar, Tieu, Gibson, Win, & Berryman, 2014), between travellers 
and the TfNSW. This contract is often characterised by an agency problem because mode 
choice is driven by a traveller’s heterogeneous set of preferences which are not addressed 
adequately by the TfNSW. In most cases, the TfNSW performs its task well by aligning with 
government preference (such as a limited budget) although it is assumed that travellers’ 
satisfaction and choice preference should be maximised by TfNSW.
In this study, traveller preference and utility are regarded as key indicators of the trav-
eller–TfNSW relationship. Traveller preference is only one of the major choice functions 
that have a multitude of influences on TfNSW, but consideration of traveller preference 
in project design and implementation may reduce project failure. There are also a large 
number of actors, both internal and external, who affect the success or failure of a transport 
project (Anwar, 2013). This means that TfNSW may need to compromise with multiple sets 
of interests while it performs on behalf of the traveller and, therefore, choice conflicts may 
arise. The ability of TfNSW to resolve these conflicts will significantly affect its success or 
failure to overcome agency problem.
Likewise, utility is regarded as a key indicator of traveller satisfaction. The idea of an 
individual’s utility function is expressed by the gain of satisfaction, which may be financial, 
social and/or psychic, in a mathematical form. These gains are called ‘utility’ from an eco-
nomic point of view, and the idea of utility is that individuals tries to maximise their utility 
(i.e. gains) over the set of possible choice sets that are obtainable.
AT argues that agency problems arise from the informational asymmetries and choice 
conflict in the traveller and TfNSW relationship. AT considers this relationship as a con-
tractual phenomenon (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), where the agent or TfNSW is to perform 
services on behalf of the travellers. Based on these assumptions, both principal and agent are 
rational economic entities and both are self-interested maximisers of their choice utility. The 
idea of a ‘contract’ in AT is introduced to recognise the necessary metaphorical agreement 
between the principal and the agent that specifies the obligations of each party. This implies 
that TfNSW is obliged to provide transport service as travellers demand. Accordingly, 
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traveller preference is an element that influences utility and needs to be analysed from the 
TfNSW point of view to achieve a balanced agency relationship (Anwar et al., 2014). Thus, 
in order to achieve a balanced agency relationship, considering traveller preferences in the 
planning and management process is imperative. According to the AT, if most of the people 
use public transportation (trains and buses only), the optimal condition is achieved. That 
means that to obtain a reliable agency relationship, an acceptable agency problem, public 
transport use should be higher than private car use.
In summary, travellers entrust their desires for reliable modes of transport to the TfNSW 
and assume that the TfNSW can be an effective agent to provide it. Limited access by the 
traveller to monitor the TfNSW’s performance is observed and this causes choice conflicts. 
The TfNSW provides public transport, such as trains and buses, for the traveller and tries to 
accommodate customer expectations into the service. Travellers also have the opportunity 
to use their own cars (private transport). In this situation, a traveller makes choices between 
the use of their private car and public transport based on their utility maximisation con-
cept, determined by choice preferences. Once travellers perceive the maximum utility, they 
choose that particular mode of transport. Based on their mode choice, whenever there is 
a low use of public transport it is likely that the TfNSW is not performing well enough to 
satisfy travellers’ expectations; an agency conflict is created. In contrast, whenever there is 
a high use of public transport, the TfNSW is performing well enough to satisfy travellers’ 
expectations and an agency conflict is avoided.
Research methodology
Data
The data source for this research was the cross-sectional 2010/11 household travel survey 
(HTS) data released in 2012. This was the largest and most comprehensive HTS of Sydney 
collected by the Bureau of transport statistics (BTS) of TfNSW. The BTS conducted a house-
hold questionnaire survey in three areas: Sydney, Newcastle and the Illawarra, and collected 
three types of data: Household, Person and Trip data. Later on the BTS created linked trip 
data that has not been used in this paper. For this present paper, only ‘Sydney Statistical 
Division (SSD)’ and ‘person trip data’ were considered for analysis. The HTS consisted of a 
face-to-face interview survey carried out every day from July to June of the financial year 
2010/11. This collection method ensured high data quality and maximised response rates. 
Each respondent was requested to maintain a simple travel diary to record the details of 
all trips undertaken for the nominated last 24-h period. An interviewer then interviewed 
each respondent to collect the details of each trip. For further details about the HTS, its 
scope, coverage and methodology, please see Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS, 2012).
Description of variables
Six latent variables (LVs) and 13 socio-demographic variables (SDVs) are evaluated in this 
paper to analyse traveller preference heterogeneity and to explore the association between 
traveller choice and service provided by TfNSW. LVs are: (i) comfort, (ii) convenience, (iii) 
safety, (iv) flexibility, (v) reliability and (vi) satisfaction and 20 indicators (Table 2) were 
set to explain them. Because of limited information in the HTS data-set, these indicators 
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are considered only to represent LVs in this paper. The 13 explanatory variables (objective 
attributes) are: annual income (in Australian dollars), age (in years), gender (1 if male, 0 
otherwise), having children (0–14 years), car ownership, family size, full-time workers of 
household, travel time (in minutes), travel cost (in Australian dollars), waiting time (in 
minutes), trip rate (trips per person per day), trip purpose (1 if work, 0 otherwise) and 
distance travelled (in kilometres).
In HTS, the respondents (travellers) were asked about the reason for choosing a particu-
lar mode of transport (private or public) and some multiple answers were given. Travellers 
answered with the appropriate reason according to their experiences. For example, if ‘enjoy 
time to read/relax on vehicle’ was answered by a respondent as a reason for choosing a par-
ticular mode, it implied that the respondent views this indicator as important and, therefore, 
this indicator was marked 1 otherwise 0 (zero). In this way, y1–y6, y14–y17 and y10–y13 were 
determined by either 1 or 0.
The indicators y7–y9 were used to represent safety. The travellers were asked about their 
experience travelling on the first three trips; whether they feel safe. There were five possible 
answers: (i) always; (ii) mostly; (iii) sometimes; (iv) rarely and (v) never. If the travellers 
answered (i) to (iii), it means they perceived the trip with the particular mode as safe. On 
the other hand, responses to (iv) and (v) indicate that the trip by this mode was thought 
to be unsafe. Therefore, if they responded to (i) to (iii), they perceived the trip to be safe, 
otherwise not. In this way, the indicators were marked for 1 if the respondents put a tick 
in (i) to (iii) otherwise 0 (zero).
Modelling issues
The analysis specifically investigates the influences SDVs and LVs on mode choice prob-
ability to explore the agency problem and devise an approach to minimise the problem. 
Table 2. lVs and their indicators.
latent variables label explained by (indicators) Anwar et al. (2014) definitions
comfort y1 enjoy time to read/relax on vehicle importance with 1, otherwise 0
y2 stressfulness on vehicle importance with 1, otherwise 0
y3 service slower importance with 1, otherwise 0
convenience y4 alternative mode availability importance with 1, otherwise 0
y5 accessibility (does not go where required) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y6 Timetable availability importance with 1, otherwise 0
safety y7 safety response for mode used in 1st trip perceived a safe trip with 1, 
otherwise 0
y8 safety response for mode used in 2nd trip perceived a safe trip with 1, 
otherwise 0
y9 safety response for mode used in 3rd trip perceived a safe with 1, otherwise 0
Flexibility y10 Fixed start and finish times at office – each day 
can vary
importance with 1, otherwise 0
y11 rotating shift (work flexibility) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y12 roster shift (work flexibility) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y13 Variable hours (work flexibility) importance with 1, otherwise 0
reliability y14 Frequency (travel mode, e.g. bus) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y15 Punctuality (for public transport) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y16 Faster (for public transport) importance with 1, otherwise 0
satisfaction y17 cleanliness (cleanliness inside vehicle) importance with 1, otherwise 0
y18 Travel time Travel time in minutes
y19 Travel cost Travel cost in australian dollar 
y20 Waiting time Waiting time in minutes 
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Figure 1 describes the overall structure of the mode choice probability process for exploring 
the agency problem.
Econometric methods1
There are two approaches available for incorporating LVs into the choice models (i) the 
sequential approach (also known as two-step approach), where the LVs are needed to be 
constructed before being included into the discrete choice model as regular explanatory 
variables (Ashok, William, & Yuan, 2002; Johansson, Heldt, & Johansson, 2006). Step 1 is the 
estimation of a MIMIC (multiple indicators and multiple causes) model; a type of regression 
model with a latent dependent variable(s). Step 2 is the estimation of a choice model with 
random parameters; information from the first step is incorporated in the second step; and 
(ii) the simultaneous approach, where both processes are performed simultaneously (Bolduc, 
Boucher, & Alvarez-Daziano, 2008).
Ben-Akiva et al. (2002) argue that results obtained using the second approach are more 
consistent and rational than the other approach but this second approach is not popular 
because of its complexity. Interestingly, the estimated results using both sequential and 
simultaneous approaches were not statistically different (Raveau, Alvarez-Daziano, Yanez, 
Bolduc, & Ortuzar, 2010) and this is motivation to employ the first approach in this study 
because it is not so cumbersome to use.
Figure 1. structure of mode choice probability process.
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Modelling with LVs
 A MIMIC model, that defines LVs appropriately, is estimated first where the LVs (ηijl) are 
explained by characteristics (sijr) of the users (individuals), alternatives (mode alternative) 
and trip nature using the structural equation (Equation 1). As the analysts cannot collect 
data on LVs directly, indicators (yijp) are assigned to explain them through measurement 
using Equation (2):
where i refers to an individual, j refers to an alternative, l is an LV, r refers to explanatory 
variables that belong to SDVs, and p refers to an indicator. αjlr and γjlp are parameters to be 
estimated, while νijl and ζijp are error terms with mean of zero and standard deviation to be 
estimated. The above specifications of the MIMIC model are not restricted to the estimation 
of parameters and the results of the model depend on the selected variables.
Specifications of the latent variable model
Factor analysis was employed to investigate the structural relationships in the MIMIC 
model (describes in Table 3) that guide the specification for computation of LVs (Figure 2 
illustrates the results of this process) and results in the following set of equations.
yy1,ij = γy1,j × Comfortij + ζy1,ij yy11,ij = γy11,j × Flexibilityij + ζy11,ij
yy2,ij = γy2,j × Comfortij + ζy2,ij yy12,ij = γy12,j × Flexibilityij + ζy12,ij
yy3,ij = γy3,j × Comfortij + ζy3,iq yy13,ij = γy13,j × Flexibilityij + ζy13,ij
yy4,ij = γy4,j × Convenienceij + ζy4,ij yy14,ij = γy14,j × Reliabilityij + ζy14,ij
yy5,ij = γy5,j × Convenienceij + ζy5,ij yy15,ij = γy15,j × Reliabilityij + ζy15,ij
yy6,ij = γy6,j × Convenienceij + ζy6,ij yy16,ij = γy16,j × Reliabilityij + ζy16,ij
yy7ij = γy7,j × Safetyij + ζy7,ij yy17,ij = γy17,j × Satisfactionij + ζy17,ij
yy8,iq = γy8,j × Safetyij + ζy8,ij yy18,ij = γy18,j × Satisfactionij + ζy18,ij
yy9,ij = γy9,j × Safetyij + ζy9,ij yy19,ij = γy19,j × Satisfactionij + ζy19,ij
yy10,ij = γy10,j × Flexibilityij + ζy10,ij yy20,ij = γy20,j × Satisfactionij + ζy20,ij
Figure 2 follows the path to the results of α-vector matrix of structural equations 
described in Table 3 (which were estimated using the computer programme AMOS v.19). 
It is assumed that attributes which obtain a minimum .1 coefficient explain a particular 
(1)ijl =
∑
r
jlr × sijr + ijl
(2)yijp =
∑
l
jlp × ijl + ijp
Comfortij = inc - com,j×Incomei+tco−com,j×Travel costi+wti - com,j×Waiting timei+car - com,j×Car ownershipi+dt−com,j×Distance travelledi+chi−com,j×Having childreni+ncom,
Convenienceij = age - conv,j×Agei+gen−conv,j×Genderi+car - conv,j×Car ownershipi+wti - conv,j×Waiting timei+tti - conv,j×Travel timei+chi−conv,j×Having childreni+inc−conv,j×
Safetyij = age−saf,j×Agei+tr−saf,j×Trip ratei+car−saf,j×Car ownershipi+dt−saf,j×Distnce travelledi+chi−saf,j×Having childreni+wti−saf,j×Waiting timei+nsaf,ij
Flexibilityij = gen - fle,j×Genderi+chi−fle,j×Having childreni+car - fle,j×Car ownershipi+tp−fle,j×Trip purpopsei+tp−fle,j×Trip purpopsei+nfle,ij
Reliabilityij = tti−rel,j×Travel timei+wti−rel,j×Waiting timei+ft−rel,j×Full time workersi+car - rel,j×Car ownershipi+dt−rel,j×Distance travelledi+nrel,ij
Satisfactionij = tti−sat,j × Travel timei + tco−sat,j × Travel costi + wti−sat,j ×Waiting timei + car - sat,j × Car ownershipi + age−sat,j × Agei + nsat,ijD
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LV. For example, ‘comfort’ is explained by six (6) attributes of ‘car ownership’, ‘travel cost’, 
‘having children’, ‘waiting time’, ‘distance travelled’ and ‘income’ of the traveller because 
all these attributes have at least a .1 coefficient (Table 3). Attributes that had a coefficient 
less than .1 were not used to describe an LV. The coefficient in the linear regression model 
(e.g. structural equation model) indicates the strength of impact/influence that causes an 
effect on the dependent variable. The t-value represents the significance. Strength is more 
associated with dependent variables to signify the influence and, therefore, a cut-off point 
was set to simplify the model.
These estimated matrix parameters using the MIMIC model were also used to quantify 
LVs that were incorporated in RPL models (Table 5) as explanatory variables. The alpha 
values in Table 3 are same for all alternatives. The choice of mode (i.e. alternatives) is the 
dependent variable and the factors described in Table 3 influence travellers in their mode 
choice decision-making process.
Hybrid discrete choice modelling
By maximising the utility (Uij), individuals take a decision based on the assumption of ran-
dom utility theory. It is also assumed that an analyst can only determine a representative 
portion (systematic component) of the utility (Vij) function, therefore, an error term (εij) 
for each alternative (Ortuzar & Willumsen, 2001) is required to be included in the function 
as a stochastic component. Mathematically, the utility function becomes:
 
where Vij is a function of objective attributes Xijk, such as travel time and cost, socio-eco-
nomic and trip characteristics of the individual and k stands for all objective variables 
together.
Equation (4) is derived by including LVs in the utility function, where θjk and βjl are 
parameters to be estimated:
 
Only the alternative j is chosen, if the utility of alternative ‘j’ is greater than or equal to the 
utility of all other alternatives ‘t’ (all t includes alternative j) in the choice set C. This can be 
expressed mathematically with binary variables dij:
 
As a sequential approach was used in this study, the discrete choice model is estimated 
with the MIMIC model’s structure and measurement Equations (1) and (2) (Ben-Akiva 
et al., 2002).
Specifications of the RPL model
Because of its ability to measure random taste variation and to allow an unrestricted substi-
tution pattern and correlation among unobserved factors that help to address the limitations 
of initially innovated logit models, (e.g. multinomial (MNL) and nested logit (NL) models) 
the RPL model shows better performance. The standard deviations of random parameters 
(3)Uij = Vij + ij,
(4)Vij =
∑
k
jk × Xijk +
∑
l
jl × ijl
(5)dij =
{
1 if Uij ≥ Uit , ∀t ∈ C
0 other case
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in this model depict the degree of unobserved heterogeneity; and heterogeneity around 
the mean describes the interaction between random parameters and specified attributes.
According to Equation (3), the utility that an individual i receives from alternative j is 
denoted by Uij, which is the sum of the systematic component Vij and a stochastic compo-
nent εij and has a linear relationship.
Within a logit context a condition is imposed such that εij is the independent and identi-
cally distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 (Gumbel Distribution). Initially, independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property is also appeared in logit models such as MNL and 
NL models. These limitations (IID and IIA) should be taken into account in some way. For 
example, the stochastic component can be divided into two additive parts that are uncor-
related. One part is correlated and heteroskedastic among the alternatives and the other 
part is IID over alternatives and individuals
Figure 2. latent variables model relationships.
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where xij is a vector of explanatory variables that are observed by the analyst; βj is a vec-
tor of parameters to be estimated; zij is a vector of characteristics that can vary between 
individuals or alternatives, or both (there may be some common elements in both zij and 
xij); eij is a random term with zero mean that is IID over individuals and alternatives and 
is normalised to set the scale of utility; random variable (δi) is a vector of random terms 
with zero mean that varies over individuals according to the distribution f(δ|Ω), where Ω 
are the fixed parameters of the distribution f.
In matrix form, it can be written as:
If IIA exists, then δ = 0 for all i and so utility U depends only on the systematic and IID 
stochastic portion of utility. Initially innovated logit models assume that IIA does not esti-
mate Zδ; thus δ is assumed as zero. Because of this, unobserved taste variations are not 
addressed in initially innovated logit models. Hence, by incorporating the effect of Zδ in 
the utility function, discrete choice models are able to accommodate those impacts and thus 
avoid the IIA assumption. These models estimate Ω (the parameters of the distribution of 
δ) as well as β.
To derive a RPL model from Equation (7), e is assumed to be a IID extreme value, while 
δ follows a general distribution f(δ|Ω). If δ = 0, it is MNL which has the IIA property. 
Estimation of the RPL generally involves estimating β and Ω. The choice probabilities 
depend on β and δ and the probability to select alternative j for individual i with conditional 
on δ is similar as the MNL model below:
 
As δ is not given, by integrating over all values of δ weighted by the density of δ, the uncon-
ditional choice probability for each individual can be obtained as below.
 
i.e.
 
Models of this form are called RPL because the choice probability Lj(δ) is a mixture of logits 
with ƒ as the mixing distribution. The RPL is characterised by accommodating heterogeneity 
as a continuous function of the parameters which are randomly and normally distributed.
(6)Uij = xijj + (ziji + eij)
(7)U = X + (Z + e)
(8)
P
�
j��
�
= Lj() =
eXjj+Zj∑
k∈J
eXkk+Zk
(9)P
�
j
�
= ∫

⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
eXjj+Zj∑
k∈J
eXkk+Zk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
f (�Ω)
(10)P
(
j
)
= ∫

Lj()f (|Ω)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Regression weights of indicators representing LVs
In this paper, 20 indicators were selected to explain six LVs. Several groups of factor ana-
lytic models were examined to identify the weights of indicators to represent the LVs and 
the models were estimated using AMOS v.19 software. To understand the validity of the 
indicators that represent LVs there are exploratory analyses described in Table 4.
In group 1 in Table 4, the indicators representing comfort and convenience have been 
evaluated to check their validity. Six indicators were assumed to have significant impact on 
the variables comfort and convenience. After estimating the regressions weights, it was found 
that indicators have a significant effect on representing comfort and convenience variables.
The influence of stressfulness is higher on comfort while people travel, whereas conven-
ience is highly dependent on accessibility of mode in their choice process. According to 
group 1 in Table 4, the regression weights of the first three indicators are higher and more 
significant than convenience. This indicates that these three indicators are more relevant 
to represent comfort rather than convenience. For the rest of the indicators in group 1, the 
regression weights are more relevant to convenience as they are statistically significant and 
have higher regression weights than comfort.
Other LVs in groups 2 and 3 can also be explained in a similar way and the overall 
acceptability of these weights was satisfactory. Evidence of an acceptable level was achieved 
through various goodness-of-fit criteria such as goodness-of-fit index (GFI), adjusted good-
ness-of-fit index (AGFI), normed fit index (NFI), comparative fit index (CFI) and root-
mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA).
Results
Table 5 summarises the estimated results of RPL models. A number of SDVs and LVs were 
integrated in the models to observe the overall impacts of relevant attributes on traveller 
mode choice.
The analysis suggests that both models produce similar results when considering SDVs, 
but when LVs are included the importance of LVs exceeds those of SDVs. For example, 
findings from both the socio-demographic random parameter logit (SDRPL) model (that 
includes SDVs only) and the hybrid RPL (HRPL) model (that includes both SDVs and LVs) 
suggest that ‘travel time’ had a greater impact on traveller mode choice than ‘travel cost’. 
Also, the effect of ‘trip purpose’ on mode choice was shown to decrease between SDRPL 
and HRPL and the same scenario was found for the effects of ‘family size’, ‘full time workers’ 
and ‘trip rate’. An interesting outcome was the identified decrease in the effect of ‘waiting 
time’ on mode choice in the HRPL model. This finding is consistent with those of the 
BTS report (BTS, 2012) which suggests a growing uptake of public transport by travellers 
who appear to place less importance on waiting time. Unlike the SDRPL model, however, 
the HRPL model identified ‘age’ as a significant factor in mode choice, particularly in the 
case of elderly people who generally seek a comfortable or convenient mode of transport. 
Similarly, the effect of ‘car ownership’ is higher in the HRPL model which indicates that a 
car maximises the desired utility that may be induced by LVs rather than SDVs.
The importance of LVs to travellers is clearly observed in the HRPL models. All of them 
are statistically significant except the variable ‘flexibility’. The variables with the highest 
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Table 5. Modelling results.
Attributes SdRPl (t-values) HRPl (t-values)
Random parameter in utility functions
Travel cost (mean) −3.14 (–4.15) −2.09 (–3.00)
Travel cost (st.dev.) .41 (3.11) .70 (2.22)
Waiting time (mean) −1.76 (–3.19) −1.70 (–4.00)
Waiting time (st.dev.) .03 (5.00) .09 (3.94)
age (mean) −.111 (–.05) −.091(–1.60)
age (st.dev.) .25 (1.891) .49 (1.70)
car ownership (mean) 1.86 (5.11) 1.94 (5.55)
car ownership (st.dev.) .01 (4.51) .05 (3.55)
having children (mean) −1.77 (–4.11) −1.81 (–5.01)
having child (st.dev.) .06 (4.00) .09 (5.19)
Trip purpose (mean) .071(3.01) .062 (3.00)
Trip purpose (st.dev.) .04 (3.12) .02 2.72)
comfort (mean) 3.51 (8.79)
comfort (st.dev.) .11 (6.66)
convenience (mean) 3.25 (5.46)
convenience (st.dev.) .02 (4.36)
safety (mean) 5.51 (10.22)
safety (st.dev.) .09 (7.01)
Flexibility (mean) .72 (.80)
Flexibility (st.dev.) .03 (1.21)
reliability (mean) 5.71 (9.01)
reliability (st.dev.) .01 (5.15)
satisfaction (mean) 1.25 (3.00)
satisfaction (st.dev.) .10 (3.25)
Non-random parameter in utility functions
Travel time −1.20 (–4.10) −1.13 (–4.64)
gender .40 (1.89) −.214 (–2.01)
income 1.99 (2.11) 1.46 (1.99)
Family size .90 (1.12) .89 (1.00)
Full time workers of hh .94 (.56) .93 (.07)
Trip rate .89 (2.55) .85 (2.70)
distance travelled −.81 (–2.22) −.26 (–1.90)
Mode constant
car as a passenger (base) 0 0
car as a driver −2.09 (–3.00) −2.56 (–10.0)
Train −2.21 (–4.41 −2.41 (–4.15)
bus −.15 (–4.89) −.103 (–3.11)
Heterogeneity around the mean
Travel cost: income −.129 (–3.51) −.011 (–4.11)
Waiting time: income −.48 (–5.01) −.033 (–4.15)
age: income −.07 (–.98) −.11 (–1.96)
car ownership: income .011 (2.91) .61 (4.15)
having child: income −.1 (–3.16) −.19 (–4.07)
Purpose: income .001 (3.01) .052 (3.11)
comfort: income .101 (4.21)
convenience: income .112 (3.80)
safety: income .51 (10.51)
Flexibility: income .052 (1.80)
reliability: income .35 (9.10)
satisfaction: income .089 (4.11)
Model statistics
log likelihood function −696.80 −576.53
McFadden pseudo r-squared .28 .38
aic .0165 .0136
Modal choice probability
car as a driver .720 .770
car as a passenger .204 .211
Train .049 .020
bus .053 .033
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impact in both years were ‘safety’ and ‘reliability’, followed by ‘comfort’ and ‘convenience’. 
Overall, the impact of LVs on mode choice was greater than the impact of SDVs.
As usual in model statistics, the values of McFadden pseudo R-squared are inflated 
from SDRPL which indicates that the HRPL is better for understanding the traveller mode 
choice heterogeneity. According to Akaike information criterion (AIC), HRPL represents 
the lower AIC which means that the predicted values using this model are closer to the real 
values compared to SDRPL model and the lowest AIC values signify the best model. Thus, 
HRPL models are better than SDRPL models in this case and the HRPL technique is more 
appropriate for interpreting the relationship between travellers and TfNSW.
An inferred relationship between traveller and TfNSW
According to the results above, some of the attributes (such as travel time and comfort) are 
influential on the traveller decision-making process and TfNSW is able to adjust or control 
some of those attributes to meet traveller expectations. An interaction in such a way between 
service providers and users reflects a relationship indicated in AT. Furthermore, travellers 
(the principal) provide their satisfactory or unsatisfactory feedback or opinions to TfNSW 
about the available services which are treated as delegated tasks for TfNSW (agent).
As suggested by the results described in Section 3, travellers demonstrate their expec-
tations for safe, reliable, comfortable and convenient journey considering LVs whereas, 
according to SDVs, travellers expect reasonable costs, and less travel and waiting time for 
trips. Although travellers explicitly state their preferences, public transport use is substan-
tially lower than car use which indicates goal/choice conflict (also called moral hazard). 
Again, information asymmetry also exists in the traveller and TfNSW relationship. For 
example, once LVs are included in the model, the SDVs (e.g. waiting time, travel time) 
become less influential (in terms of coefficients) on the decision made by travellers. Thus, 
travellers have more information than does the TfNSW about the attributes of their (trav-
ellers) utility function and only travellers possess information about the importance that 
they attach to this utility which contributes to information asymmetries.
Transport service should reflect these preferences and used by TfNSW in the public 
transport service to improve the agency problem. At the same time, most travellers use 
private cars to enjoy expected trips. In this situation, travellers take the mode – either public 
transport (e.g. train, bus) or private transport (e.g. car) – that maximises the satisfactory 
condition or utility. TfNSW has the experiences and skills to provide the satisfactory or 
expected services but due to internal constraints, such as limited budget, traveller may be 
provided with unsatisfactory services and an agency problem arises. In the other words, 
TfNSW wants to reduce the cost of the transport services and seeks to provide maximum 
utility for the users with the minimum cost. In contrast, travellers expect optimal service 
(i.e. customer focused) to assure the effective contract and, as a result, expenses for TfNSW 
may increase eventually. Hence, reducing cost is treated as maximisation of TfNSW’s utility 
and getting optimal/expected service from TfNSW is maximisation of traveller’s utility i.e. 
satisfaction.
Travellers are not in a position to be aware, at a reasonable level, about the implementing 
phase of mode service undertaken by the TfNSW and this leads to choice conflicts as indi-
cated in AT. Thus, TfNSW may be directly influenced by other related stakeholders such as 
politicians, administrators, and transport companies, and the traveller’s direct participation 
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in TfNSW’s project finalising stage is limited (Anwar, 2013). Therefore, choice conflicts 
occur and ultimately agency problems arise.
The reason behind choice conflicts has been identified through RPL models. In these 
models, various choice attributes are analysed and interpreted and the models summarise 
the dominant attributes (such as travel time, waiting time, comfort, safety) which are even-
tually travellers’ expectations of the service. Based on these expected attributes, the mode 
choice probability is calculated. In this present research, the probability of private transport 
use was found to be the highest indicating travellers’ dissatisfaction with existing public 
transport service and an agency problem. Therefore, increasing public transport use may 
be an option to reduce the agency problem.
A pathway to agency problem improvement in transport services
Travel demand forecasting and policy evaluation methods have not been discussed in the 
last decade to the same extent as the estimation of hybrid discrete choice models. This fore-
casting method is used in this paper to investigate how to minimise the agency problem.
According to the specifications of the MIMIC model, change in the explanatory varia-
bles should cause changes in the LVs. These changes may have an impact on the MIMIC 
model as well as on the utility functions in the choice model. Due to the changes in utility 
function, traveller mode choice probabilities are affected accordingly. The changes in the 
choice forecasting probabilities may be caused by the variations in explanatory variables 
related to SDVs. The changes in the explanatory variables sijr and the tangible attributes Xijk 
may affect the choices implicitly through the LVs or the alternative utilities by which the 
changes in choice probabilities may be observed.
The changes in traveller choices, which are associated with the overall transport system 
in a city, are allied with changes in SDVs. Again, the changes in SDVs contribute to con-
struct the psychological (i.e. LVs) mindset of human beings and, eventually, the LVs impact 
on mode choice to influence the overall structure of trips. Thus, the transport forecasting 
context is an interrelationship among various observed and unobserved factors related to 
the transport management system. It is understood that traditional mode choice models 
(without LVs) are not generally sensitive to policies which affect the transport manage-
ment system. Policies are associated with the changes to the management system which, 
in turn, may have an impact on the observed mobility structure of the travellers. Thus, the 
LVs would be able to capture transport system changes because the explanatory variables 
are related to demographics as well as the alternatives included in the MIMIC model to 
Table 6. Forecasting changes in traveller mode choice.
achanges are the differences in the probabilities between changed and unchanged conditions.
Mode
base year mode 
share in %
Predicted changesa
Scenario 1 (S1) Scenario 2 (S2) Scenario 3 (S3)
SdRPl HRPl SdRPl HRPl SdRPl3 HRPl SdRPl HRPl
car as a driver 72.0 77.0 −.07 .21 −1.00 −.85 −.54 −.32
car as a passenger 20.4 21.1 .33 .17 .95 .52 .64 .35
Train 4.9 2.0 −.04 .08 −.08 −.01 −.06 .04
bus 5.3 3.3 −.08 −.04 .51 .48 .22 .22
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evaluate the traveller motivational process. This is an important measure to be considered 
when forecasting changes using the estimated models.
On the basis of the empirical case presented in this study, three hypothetical scenarios 
are tested (i) increase in income by 10% for all respondents (S1); (ii) decrease in travel 
cost and waiting time by 10% for public transport (S2) and (iii) implementing both (i) and 
(ii) concurrently (S3). The variation of income affects directly: (i) the LV, as income is an 
explanatory variable in the MIMIC model and (ii) the utility functions, due to inclusion 
of it in the utility functions. These scenarios are modelled to observe the increase of public 
transport use which avoids the agency problem.
Table 6 presents the base year market shares, which are estimated by each model under 
no-change conditions along with market share changes predicted by the estimated models 
considering three hypothetical scenarios.
The forecast changes do not have the same direction for all modes. Three scenarios 
have been considered here to understand the predicting policies. For S1, the variations in 
the HRPL model have a positive direction for all modes except the bus. According to the 
SDRPL model under the same scenario, only train use is increased. Increasing income may 
contribute to increase in the usage of public transport though only bus usage is forecast 
negatively with a nominal coefficient value in the forecasting model. The reason may be 
that the people who have adequate income do not like to be exhausted by self-driving and 
are happy to use public transport. Another example may be brought to mind here: the cost 
of travel by train to Sydney Airport is very expensive and the cost may motivate people to 
use their car despite the train being a very convenient way to travel to the airport. Therefore, 
increasing income may have an influence on the decision to take the train rather than the 
car. This indicates that increasing an individual’s income may prompt the travellers to travel 
by train. This is an interesting finding to help policy-makers.
As per Scenario 2, the probabilities of train and bus use are increased in both the SDRPL 
and HRPL models. This implies that reduced travel cost and waiting times are helpful in 
reducing travel by car. Furthermore, it is observed that the predicted changes to train and 
bus use probability are the highest in the SDRPL model of S2, compared with other sce-
narios. When service is frequent enough, people may not perceive waiting as much of a 
burden (Iseki, Taylor, & Miller, 2006). When people know the service schedule with a high 
degree of certainty, they can adjust their arrival to a transit facility to reduce waiting time 
(Evans, 2004; Reed, 1995). By providing on time operation of the transit service, people can 
reduce waiting time. Due to its readily available schedules and more dependable service, 
people generally perceive waiting times for commuter trains less burdensome than waiting 
times for irregular bus services (Evans, 2004). Therefore, reduction in the uncertainty (or 
increase in reliability) in waiting time is likely to reduce the disutility (or increase the utility) 
of transit service (Reed, 1995).
In Scenario 3, the SDRPL model shows that probabilities of car use, both as a driver and 
as a passenger, are reduced while the conditions of S1 and S2 are implemented concurrently. 
On the other hand, the probability of train usage is higher than the HRPL model as increas-
ing; ‘individual income’ and reduced travel cost and waiting time are included together.
Additionally, as expected, the HRPL model in S1 predicts an increase in private modes 
of travel due to increasing income as a changed condition, while the other HRPL models in 
S2 and S3 forecast a decrease in private modes because of inclusion of reduced travel cost 
and waiting time as a changed condition. This may indicate that the hybrid RPL models 
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are effectively more sensitive, as expected, but this higher sensitivity does not imply just 
a simple amplification of the effects involved. Consequently, the importance of including 
LVs in the choice models is even clearer.
It is understood that increasing income, reducing travel costs and waiting times have the 
ability to attract travellers to public transport rather than to private modes of transport and 
results in minimising the agency problem. After implementing these hypothetical scenarios, 
it is found that the probability of private transport use has been reduced to a reasonable level 
and the probabilities of public transport (train and bus) use have been increased to some 
extent (Table 6). It confirms that integrating traveller choice preferences in transportation 
planning helps to improve the traveller and TfNSW relationship by reducing the agency 
problem. Therefore, it can be concluded that traveller-demand oriented changes in relevant 
attributes can minimise the agency problem in the relationship.
Conclusions and policy responses
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, it argues the applicability of AT to the 
provision of transport services; which is a new dimension to present traveller preference in 
the traveller choice process. Secondly, it models the LVs and SDVs separately and concur-
rently to explore their influences of choice attributes on traveller decisions and by which the 
relationship between traveller and TfNSW is addressed. Thirdly, it demonstrates the mode 
choice probability analysis as an approach to reduce the agency problem.
The analysis of the traveller-TfNSW relationship is relevant for transport policy for-
mulation. As described, the relationship is addressed by the traveller choice preferences. 
If the heterogeneity in traveller choice is fully understood, the relevant organisation i.e. 
TfNSW would be able to provide satisfactory service for the users. Therefore, the nature of 
the demand and behaviour of travellers should be included in the transport policy for the 
policy to be worthwhile.
This study finds that the travellers of the SSD are inclined to use private cars rather than 
use public transport and this indicates TfNSW’s dearth of awareness about travellers’ utility 
functions and choices. To avoid the agency problem, policy responses should pay more 
attention to the traveller utility functions. It is well validated by this research that transport 
policy-makers should recognise traveller utility functions at the policy formulation level. As 
well, this study clarifies the nature of traveller preference attributes, which form the traveller 
utility function, in the relationship between traveller and TfNSW. The study identifies the 
attributes of the traveller-TfNSW relationship that are most important to travellers. Thus, 
the attributes that are most important to travellers should influence policy finalisation.
Furthermore, the behavioural findings and modelling techniques have direct policy and 
planning interventions in future transport management. Firstly, as LVs are found as signifi-
cantly important in travel behaviour, ignoring them in the planning process could result in 
serious errors in public transport management. Therefore, to achieve the set objectives fixed 
by TfNSW and transport planners systematic attention to LVs is required in transportation 
planning and policies. Secondly, integrating the LVs in the relationship between travellers 
and TfNSW reduces the agency problem because of the understanding that comes from 
more realistic descriptions of travellers’ decision-making.
In order to minimise the agency problem, reducing some SDVs such as travel cost and 
waiting time has a significant effect on switching private transport use to public transport 
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use. This type of SDVs constitutes the LVs and, eventually, LVs lead to traveller behaviour 
changes. It is also observed that increasing income works to reduce private car use. This 
research evaluated three hypothetical scenarios, which could be helpful in reducing the 
agency problem in the relationship between travellers and TfNSW. It was found that in the 
hypothetical scenarios the probability of car use was decreased and this is the key motivation 
to minimise the agency problem in the relationship. However, the response of the TfNSW 
towards travellers’ desires is highly complex because people of different socio-economic 
backgrounds have different expectations. This paper simplifies the response mechanism 
by examining ways to decrease the agency problem that helps transport policy-makers to 
incorporate the findings of this study into future policies.
Note
1.  The authors employed econometric methods similar to those that have been used by Anwar 
et al. (2014).
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